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BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
U N I T E D I T F L I E S -- T H E S P I N E L L I 
PLAN FOR EUROPE'S AERONAUTICAL INDUSTRY 
The recommendation of the Commission of the European Community that Europe's 
aeronautical industry should undergo a major rationalization process is 
the result of a long and detailed report by an expert committee. TI1e 
main feature of the recommendations announced in July by Commissioner 
Altiero Spinelli was that there should be one single aircraft engine 
enterprise in Western Europe, and two enterprises producing airframes. 
These enterprises would presumably involve both government and private 
participation. Commissioner Spinelli, who is responsible for industrial, 
technical and scientific affairs in the European Community administration, 
also made recommendations for intra-European harmonization of airline 
networks and fares. 
The European aircraft industry is competitive with that of the United 
States in ingenuity and skill, but not in cost-efficiency. In the past 
twenty years, the only long-haul aircraft produced in Europe have been 
Britain's De Havilland Comet and Vickers VC-10. Medium- and short-haul 
airliners have been produced in Europe in competition with each other --
for instance, France's Caravelle, Britain's BAC-111 successor, and the 
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British three-engine Trident. The most commercially successful short-
haul European aircraft have been the Fokker F-27 Friendship, produced in the 
Netherlands, France 1 s Caravelle, and Britain 1 s ViscoWlt. 
TI1e aim of the EC aeronautical program proposed to the policy-making 
Council of the Community by Mr. Spinelli is to maximize the possibilities 
of intra-European cooperation in the industry, particularly in the fields 
of financing, research and development, testing, and initial production. 
First "European" ventures in this direction have so far been bilateral 
rather than truly European, and concern aircraft like the supersonic 
Concorde not yet in service, and the Fokker F-28 Fellowship of which 
delivery commenced only recently. 
Failure in spite of success 
The Western European aircraft industry, which occupied a competitive 
place with that of the United States before World War II, now supplies only 
9.5 per cent of aircraft used in the non-communist world; three-fifths of 
Western European airplanes are produced in Britain. Aircraft manufactured 
within the six-nation Community only satisfy 15 per cent of the Community 
market. British aircraft supply 70 per cent of the British market; but several 
British aircraft firms have collapsed in recent years, even when producing 
aircraft of acknowledged quality .and apparent market success. 
The preponderance of the United States in the aircraft market is 
partly explained by the fact that long-haul aircraft constitute 50 per 
cent of the global market by value: all recent long-haul aircraft produced in 
the non-communist world, except for the VC-10, have been American. 
In spite of its market success, the United States aerospace industry 
has also been experiencing difficulties following cutbacks in government-
financed military and space programs. Mid-1972 has seen some recovery, 
notably in the West Coast aircraft industry, but it is not thought likely 
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that the industry's dollar production value will return to the peak 
figures of 1968 in the near future. The EC Conmission report sees this 
as an added reason why Europe's less favored industry should unite to 
survive. 
Just as the American industry's principal advantage is an accident 
of geography -- the presence of a huge internal aircraft market -- so 
Britain's lead in European aircraft production dates from an accident of. 
history -- the advances in research and developnent gained through 
Britain's role as a gigantic aircraft carrier in World War II. But 
although there are nationwide production norms for the U. S. industry, 
Europe's norms are still varied, and there is not even yet a European 
airworthiness code. A unifying factor, however, has been the tendency for 
European carriers to accept American norms and standards. 
The advantage of being big 
The report stresses that whereas American and other foreign aircraft 
of over fifteen tons all up weight (a.u.w.) can be imported into the 
European Gammon Market duty free, the United States imposes a customs 
tax of 5 per cent on imported aircraft. (Britain has a rarely applied tariff of 
7 per cent). This and other factors have obliged European governments to 
subsidize aircraft production -- as the United States government proposed 
to do in the case of the supersonic transport (SST) project. 
The report states: "The conSiderable and growing complexity and 
expense of aircraft materials require production units of ever greater 
dimensions . • . Even if the principal production enterprise subcontracts 
part of the work to smaller enterprises, the principal finn assumes the 
overall industrial risk: it is therefore advantageous that this sort of 
enterprise should be both big and highly concentrated." The report notes 
that the four largest American aircraft producers each have a higher gross 
/ 
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income than the combined aircraft industries of the Six. (The Conmnmity 
aircraft industry earned a revenue of $2.293 billion in 1970.) 
The report admits that international cooperation in a manufacturing 
project has disadvantages as well as the obvious benefits of rationalization. 
International operations increase delays and the number of personnel 
employed. Where governments are directly involved, the political insta-
bility of administrations interferes with policy, including budget 
policy, and magnifies the demand for equal sharing and for an equal "fair 
return". :Multinational enterprises seem to have less market penetration 
thrust than single-company enterprises. The report says that when the 
cooperation is purely at the level of industrial enterprises, success 
depends on the integration of the project under the accepted authority 
of one enterprise. This form of cooperation works best where one 
partner is considerably bigger than the others -- which are thus essentially 
subcontractors. 
Growth and restraints 
The report says that unless there is a serious worldwide depression, 
all phases of the aircraft industry will continue to grow in the years to 
come. The demand for new civil aircraft, following a financially 
debilitative, premature rash of renewals of certain types of aircraft and 
aircraft building materials in the mid-Sixties, is now beginning to pick 
up again. However, carriers and manufacturers will now face new and 
costly restraints: the exigencies of environmental policy, the conflict 
between airfield building and urban planning, and new competition from 
highspeed surface transport. These are principally expected to affect 
air transport in the 1985-2000 period. 
Among other problems pinpointed by the report are the anticipated 
worldwide contraction of defense and space-travel spending, reducing the 
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amount of government money accorded to research on new aircraft and 
materials, and the "threat" of the Soviet and Japanese aeronautical 
industries. The success of the five international aircraft projects now 
going on in Europe -- Concorde, Airbus, Mercure, Fokker F-28, and VFW-614 
-- would depend on sales outside as well as inside Europe. Market 
perspectives and the credible capacity for growth of the Community 
aircraft industry would not justify production of the full spectrum of 
large airplanes and powerful engines. ''The Conmruni ty can, without serious 
inconvenience, continue to satisfy a considerable part of its needs through 
:imports',' the report said. Only one type of aircraft iri each category 
should be produced. There were already too many canpeting European 
projects for short takeoff and landing (STOL) planes, for instance. 
There also was scope for collaboration between European and non-
European enterprises, especially American firms. This could assist both 
partners to reach joint markets. Coiiiilllility and non-Colllmmity governments 
could be invited to cooperate, also, to "design the ground rules behini 
which industrialists could take shelter, cooperate, and canpete in a 
situation of equal opportunity." 
Zeroing in on 1985-2000 
There should also be rationalization among purchasers, permitting 
more substantial orders. The report praised as a ''major step" in that 
direction a group of five airlines -- Air France, Alitalia, Lufthansa, 
Sabena, and Iberia -- into the "ATLAS" unit, and the grouping of four 
others (KIM, SAS, Swissair, and UTA) in the KSSU unit. ·In each case, 
the airlines retain their independence, but cooperate in purchasing and 
maintenance. 
The objective should be the establishment of a small number of large 
international enterprises which would take sole responsibility for major 
/ 
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programs. These enterprises should zero in on the needs of the industry in 
the period 1985-2000. They should take account of the exigencies of 
environmental protection, the need to reduce noise and gaseous effluents, 
and the problem of airport congestion. 
The report devoted considerable space to the question of credit. 
It said Community manufacturers were handicapped in their competition with 
other manufacturers because there was no equivalent European institution 
to the Eximbanks of Japan and the United States. The .American Eximbank 
had pursued a continuous policy of export credits for aeronautical 
products, on the basis of a five-year repayment period for turbo-prop 
aircraft and seven years for pure jets, with a down payment of 10 per 
cent and interest rates varying from 5 per cent to 7 per cent. Following 
recommendations by the National Export Development Council, easier terms 
had more recently been granted in same cases -- such as no down payment 
and reimbursement over ten years. 
The report said that at present each country issued airworthiness 
certificates on the basis of national requirements. Disparity between 
these requirements sometimes hindered the sale of European aircraft in 
neighboring European countries, although all accepted the F.A.A. criteria 
used for granting a Certificate of Airworthiness (C. of A.) to aircraft 
manufactured in the United States. The International Association of 
Aerospace Material t~facturers (AICMA) had suggested that a Joint 
Ainvorthiness Code be adopted in Europe as soon as possible. AICMA 
groups companies and certification authorities in Germany, Belgium, 
France, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden. 
The report recommended that although a large part of advanced 
aeronautical research must continue to depend on defense requirements, 
the Community should encourage and finance a "judicious program of 
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applied research related to overall civil aviation needs." 
Implementation texts 
The Commission sent four linplementation texts to the Council. 
The first recommended a coordinated development policy and a structural 
integration of present aeronautical enterprises. The second dealt with 
the financing of research and development, and with investment and 
marketing. The third recommended a conmon policy of credit, cred.i t guaran-
tees, exchange guarantees and guarantees against increases in production 
costs where Cormmm.ity programs were alined at markets outside the 
Community. The fourth text related to the tariffs on aeronautical 
products. 
The Commission recommended that the governments of the Six should 
achieve a concerted production program of new civil transport aircraft 
and power plants. It called for structural integration of aeronautical 
enterprises within the Cormmm.i ty, and for a full sharing of technical 
information. There should be close consultation with manufacturers, 
carriers, users, and those public services involved in aircraft construc-
tion and air transport. Construction enterprises should keep the 
Cornnrunity informed of all international projects of interest to the whole 
Cooununi ty. 
On the question of subsidies, the report said that the enormous 
amounts of capital immobilized by aeronautical research and development, 
and the extreme length of the aeronautical production cycle made 
government aid imperative. Development could cost from thirty to seventy 
tlines the value of the final assembly-line product. Any commercial 
aeronautical program for a single new aircraft would now cost hundreds of 
millions of dollars. Research development subsidies should therefore 
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cover the total cost of this pre-production phase, with those subsidies 
being repaid from sales. To help aircraft manufacturers procure investment 
for production, governments should guarantee loans contracted by 
manufacturers from their investors. 
To assist marketing, aid should take the form of long-term credits, 
and insurance against commercial risk. There should also be guarantees 
against exchange fluctuations, and against abnormal and unpredictible 
production cost increases occurring between contract and delivery. 
World fleets -Europe's share 
In 1970 the non-communist world fleet of long-haul aircraft 
totalled 1,478 units valued at $13,501 billion. Medium- and short-haul 
airplanes numbered 1,995, valued at $10,937 billion. These figures do 
not include aircraft in the business and private categories. Europe's 
share of these fleets totaled 21 per cent, of which 10.3 per cent were 
owned by airlines inside the Community, with 4.4 per cent in British owner-
ship and 6.3 per cent in other non-communist European countries. American 
lines own 63.9 per cent of the total and the rest of the non-communist 
world, 15.1 per cent. 
European Community airlines bought 83.4 per cent of their aircraft 
from the United States, 15.2 per cent from Community manufacturers, and 
1.4 per cent from Britain. Britain bought 71.9 per cent of its aircraft 
from local manufacturers, 28.1 per cent from American companies and none 
from Community countries. Other non-communist European countries bought 
76.9 per cent of their aircraft from American builders, 18 per cent from 
Community manufacturers and 5.1 per cent from Britain. United States 
aircraft industries supplied 97.9 per cent of the needs of American lines, 
with British industry fUrnishing most of the remaining fraction. 
The most successful European Community aircraft produced so far has 
/ 
- 9 -
been the F-27. This sold fourteen units in HOlland itself, fifty in 
other countries of the Community, and 516 elsewhere, including 200 
produced under license by Fairchild Industries in the US. France's 
Caravelle sold sixty-three units internally, thirty-seven to other 
Community markets and 179 elsewhere. By the end of 1971, the new Dutch 
F-28 had sold two units in Holland, eighteen in other Community countries, 
and twenty-seven elsewhere, the report noted. 
Air traffic grows 
In 1969, the 119 member states of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) recorded air traffic of 43,128,000,000 ton-kilameters_ 
(nearly 17 billion ton-miles), an increase of 249 per cent over 1960, or 
14.9 per cent per year. United States aircraft accounted for 57.2 per cent 
of total traffic and 27.1 per cent of international traffic. Community 
airlines accounted for 11.2 per cent of total traffic and 22.4 per cent of 
international traffic. British aircraft accounted for 5 per cent of total 
traffic and 10.3 per cent of international traffic. Other airlines 
accounted for 26.6 per cent of total traffic and 40.2 per cent of inter-
national traffic. 
French aircraft exports have risen steadily in the past decade 
from sales of $202 million in 1961 to $453 million in 1970; of this last 
figure, 57.4 per cent was represented by aircraft and airframe sales, 23 per 
cent by sales of motors and engines, 10.7 per cent by helicopter sales, 5.5 
per cent by sales of avionics and 3.4 per cent by the sale of other aircraft 
equipment. According to official figures, British aircraft sales have 
increased from $425 million in 1961 to $625 million in 1970, with a peak of 
$784 million in 1969. Nearly half of the British sales are accounted for 
by the sales of new or reconditioned aircraft engines and parts of engines. 
/ 
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In the case of military aviation sales, the proportion of engines is 
even greater. In 1970, Britain sold 34.8 per cent of its military aviation 
exports to the CoiTIIlUili ty, 24. 2 per cent to North America, 19. 9 per cent 
in the sterling zone, 3.2 per cent to EFTA countries, 1.1 per cent to 
Eastern Europe, 5.5 per cent to Latin America, and 11.3 per cent in 
other countries. 
The u. s. aircraft industry 
American aircraft exports have more than doubled in the past four 
years from $1,672,600,000 in 1966 to $3,400,000,000 in 1970. 
The military aviation fraction has fallen from 38.1 per cent in 1966 to 
25.2 per cent in 1970. In this area, missile sales have dropped from 
8 per cent of total aerospace exports to 3.2 per cent. Most civil 
aviation exports were of complete aircraft, with only a relatively 
small proportion of separate power plant sales. Eximbank credits for 
sales of jet airplanes have risen from $94,400,000 in 1966 to a level of 
nearly $600,000,000 today. Eximbank credits for the export sales of 
piston aircraft rose from $4.9 million in 1966 to $38 million in 1970. 
Eximbank guarantees against cost overruns also showed a marked increase: 
they totaled over $180 million for the first six months of 1971. 
In 1970, American aircraft industry revenue constituted 82.9 per cent 
of the non-communist world aviation trade. 
The current sales position (August 8) on the three largest American 
civil aircraft currently in production are: 
DC-10: 168 firm orders, 62 options, 42 delivered. 
Lockheed 1011: 110 firm orders and 54 options. 
Boeing 747: 209 firm orders and 189 delivered. 
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The report noted that there had already been a considerable unplanned 
compression of the European aircraft industry. In Germany, the number 
of airframe firms had fallen from twelve to three between 1963 and 1970. 
In France, the number had dropped from five to two between 1952 and 1970. 
In Italy, there were still five airframe companies, but only one of any 
size. In Britain, the number of aircraft manufacturing companies fell 
from sixteen to four in the two years between 1959 and 1961. In the realm 
of power plants, there are only two sizeable firms in France, one in 
Germany, and three in Italy -- working partly under license from foreign 
firms. In Britain, in 1966, virtually all the aviation power plant indus-
try was concentrated in the hands of Rolls-Royce. 
u.s.-European company sizes compared 
In gross turnover, according to 1970 figures, Rolls-Royce leads the 
Western European aircraft industry in turnover with a total of $645 
million, followed by $600 million for l'Aerospatiale and $496 million for 
Hawker-Siddeley Aviation. The average size of the six largest European 
airframe firms was about one-sixth the size of their American equivalents. 
Europe's two largest aero engine manufacturers were also about one-sixth 
the size of their American competitors. The report recommended the 
formation of a single Community power plant enterprise-- which-it suggested 
would still be only about half the size of General Electric. 
In the airframe sector, the report said that only three companies 
France's SNIAS and Britain's Hawker-Siddeley and BAC -- were larger than 
American subcontracting companies. It recommended the consolidation of the 
European airframe industry into two enterprises. 
Comparing funds allocated to research and developnent, the report 
quoted the following figures for 1968: 
/ 
(mil $) E. E. C. 
Military programs 559 
Space programs 247 
Civil programs 210 
Total 1,016 
Percentage of govern-
ment subsidy 93.0 
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United Kingdom 
456 
45 
225 
726 
92.1 
United States 
3,857 
5,348 
1,253 
10,458 
89.0 
The report did note, however, that French subsidies for civil aviation 
research had increased from $83 million in 1966 to $254 million in 1972 and 
for cooperative Community projects from $75 million in 1966 to a similar 
figure of $254 million in 1972. Of this last figure, $148,200,000 was 
for Concorde, $64,500,000 for the European Airbus project, and $33,100,000 
for Mercure. 
The development and production cycle 
British subsidies to civil aircraft construction have increased from 
$92 million in 1966 to approximately $200 million in 1970. In Germany, 
the figure has renained constant at about $60,000,000 a year, most of 
which is for the Airbus project. 
The complete cycle of aerospace activities 
development research, production, and marketing 
basic research, 
stretches to between 
ten and twenty years, exceptionally longer than for other industries. 
The period from research to first delivery is considerably shorter in 
the US than in Europe, in spite of the fact that American industry tools 
up for a much higher production figure than equivalent European industries. 
The increasing complexity of the aeronautical industry means that between 
25 per cent and 30 per cent of personnel are employed on research and 
development. 
It takes between four and five years to produce a new military 
- 13 -
aircraft, at considerably greater cost than for civil aircraft. The 
average new pursuit plane, including power plant and avionics, costs 
$200 million, but can reach $400 million for high perfonnance machines. The 
costliest civil aircraft development in aviation history has been the 
Concorde, the development costs of which are about eighty times the cost 
of the first production model. By 1975, from research to production will have 
taken twelve and a half years. Even for a less ambitious project like the 
Airbus, Rand D costs are about forty times the price of production models: 
development is taking five years -- or about the same as for the Douglas DC-10. 
The development figure for power plants varies from five to eight 
years, including long and expensive bench and wind-twmel testing. Research 
costs are several hundred times the value of a single production model of 
the engine. However, a successful jet engine usually spawns a whole family 
of different models for varying aircraft types, and there is a much 
higher sale of new and reconditioned models than is the case with airframes. 
The report contrasts the launching and production costs of aircraft, 
according to the number of units produced, in the following table of 
proportions: 
Units produced 
1 
30 
100 
200 
1/ 
Cost of production-
9.63 
8.35 
8.00 
7.85 
2/ 
Cost of lawlChing-
200.00 
6.66 
2.00 
1.00 
Total costs 
209.63 
15.01 
10 
8.85 
1/ Direct work, raw materials, parts and components, general production 
costs (variable and fixed), general expenses. 
2/ R&Q jigging and tooling, selling and pranotional expenses, "learning 
costs". 
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The Mercure Project 
The report examines the current transnational projects in Europe in 
two groups -- under the headings of "international industrial cooperation" 
and ''intergovernmental cooperation''. 
The longest established shared-risk international project in the 
Crnmnunity is the Mercure, a !50-passenger short-haul jet now undergoing 
flight testing. The project originated in 1966 with the French company 
Marcel Dassault collaborating with two Italian companies, Aeritalia and 
SECA, later joined by SABCA (Belgitnn), CASA (Spain), Federal Elrmen 
(Switzerland) and Canadair (Canada). All the companies are participating 
in production and all except the Swiss enterprise are contributing risk 
capital. Dassault has full responsibility for production and marketing 
and for 70 per cent of the total cost, of which 56 per centiles are 
covered by the French government. The Italian firms are responsible for 
16.8 per cent of production and approximately 10 per cent of financing. The 
other participants have smaller shares. 
Development costs for the Mercure, including two prototypes and two 
fuselages for static and fatigue testing, are put at approximately $200 million. 
The first prototype made its maiden flight May 28, 1971 and the second test 
model began flight tests this summer. Tooling-up for the assembly line 
has started; initial production will be three aircraft per month, hopefully 
rising to six. Certification tests are scheduled for the period March to 
September 1973 and Air-Inter should take delivery of the first production 
model in October 1973. Air-Inter has ordered ten units for a total cost 
of $78 million (1972 dollars), and contract completion is promised by the 
end of 1975. 
A 180-seat stretched Mercure may be produced from 1978. The present 
aircraft has Pratt and Whitney engines, but the stretched version will 
/ 
/ 
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have a larger power plant with 22,000 pounds of thrust, to be developed 
by SNECMA and General Electric, with the possible participation of Rolls-
Royce, Volvo Flygmotor and MI'U. 
Total world market for this category is estimated at 1,500 units. 
The Mercure is expected to replace the Caravelle in fleet renewals, 
especially in French and Spanish airlines. The potential French market 
for the airplane is estimated at eighty units. TI1e global target market 
for the aircraft is put at 300 units. French government export credits vary 
from 80 per cent to 84 per cent for seven to eight years, at 7 per cent 
interest. 
The Fokker Fellowship 
Another well-advanced project is the Fokker F-28 Fellowship, a short-
haul twin-jet 60-passenger liner, now in assembly-line production by Fokker-
VFW of Amsterdam. The F-28 has a range of 2,000 kilameters (1,200 
statute miles); a 75·passenger version will have a range of 1,360 kilo-
meters (850 statute miles). 
The F-28 program has been executed by VFW-Fokker of Bremen and the 
British firm Short Brothers and Harland. The power plants were purchased 
from Rolls-Royce. 
The futch share of financing was 67 per cent of developnent costs 
$40,500,000. The Dutch government covered 50 per cent of this figure, and 
this advance will be repaid by Fokker from the sales of the twenty-sixth 
to the 215th unit. For the other half of the futch financial share, Fokker-
VFW borrowed from the capital market, the loan being guaranteed by the 
State, which will receive the interests on the capital loan from the 
sales of the 127th unit onward. 
Break-even point is estimated at 175 sales. Fokker say their most 
conservative market estimate assures them of at least 250 sales over the 
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next ten years. Early this year, Fokker reported fifty orders, with 
thirty·five already delivered. 
The VFW-614 
A smaller project is the VFW·614, a 40·seat feeder·line twin jet now 
being flight-tested. VFW-Fokker is the principal manufacturer, in 
association with MBB, SABCA, and Fairey; the power plants are being 
produced by Rolls-Royce and SNECMA. 
Airfrane costs are put at 54. 5 per cent of the total, with the 
proportional cost-sharing being: Genna.ny, 70; Netherlanis, 16; Belgium, 
8; Britain, 6. Power plant costs are put at 16.9 per cent of the total, 
with Britain covering 72 per cent of the financing and France, 28 per cent. 
Market and after-sales service constitute 6 per cent of total costs, 
entirely borne by the German interest. Government cover of these invest-
ments varies from 60 per cent to 80 per cent for the various countries. 
Development costs and the production of three prototypes are estimated 
at $165 million -- $80 million for the airframe and avionics and $85 
million for the reactor. The German government is subsidizing 80 per 
cent of airframe costs and 50 per cent of power plant costs. The German 
government has also accorded a supplementary credit of $36.6 million and 
a guarantee of $41.4 million to cover a cost overrun; and if the finance 
committee of the Bundestag agrees, the German government will also provide 
$68 million to finance sales. 
Initial problems with the Rolls-Royce/SNECMA. ~-4S H engine increased 
production costs by $33 million to $109 million: the German government agreed 
to cover this overrun on condition that the manufacturers give guarantees on 
perfonnance and retail price and that VFW-Fokker guaranteed the purchase 
of a minimum number of units. 
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Germany will produce 64 per cent of the assembly-line aircraft, the 
Netherlands, 22 per cent, Belgium, 10 per cent, and Britain, 4 per cent. 
The global market for aircraft in this category is est±mated at between 
1,200 and 1,400 units; VFW-Fokker hope to capture a third of this market. 
Break-even point is said to be 175 units. 
The prototype VFW-614 flew July 14, 1971, but was later lost in a 
flight test accident on February 1, 1972. 
The Concorde saga 
Under the heading of "intergovernmental cooperation", the report 
deals with two projects -- Concorde and Airbus. In both cases, the 
governments involved have defined and financed the programs and chosen 
and supervised the manufacturers. 
Concorde is a supersonic long-haul aircraft for 128 to 144 passengers. 
The project was first agreed to by the French and British governments in 
November 1962. For the airframe, SNIAS (l'A~rospatiale) is responsible 
for 60 per cent of the development and production work and BAC, for 40 
per cent. Rolls-Royce is responsible for 67 per cent of engine production 
and SNECMA, for 33 per cent. Both countries are sharing the task of 
developing and producing the avionics and other systems. R and D costs on 
. \ 
Concorde, up to 1975, were estimated in May, 1972 at $2.5 billion. 
The two prototypes 001 and 002 have been flying since 1969; a pre-produc-
tion model is being flight-tested, a second is about to be, and ten production 
models are at different stages of the assembly line in Britain and France. 
The present schedule calls for delivery of eighteen production units by 
1975, thirty-eight by the end of 1976, seventy-three by the end of 1977, 
and 150 by the end of 1979. The production rhythm should reach three 
units a month in 1976, and the target market is 250 units over ten years. 
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A sophisticated and complicated system covers orders and options. 
Deposits are required to secure delivery positions. This gives an option 
which nrust be made finn or surrendered in periods varying from six to 
nine months. BAC say that sane US carriers took out options on Concorde 
in the hope of acquiring extended trans-Pacific routes which were later 
denied them. Early deposits are not being forfeited as, although the Concorde 
project was able to meet the payload requirements of the contract, it was 
not able to meet the original price estlinate. 
The Concorde order book currently reads (July 28, 1972) as follows: 
BOAC: 5 orders, 3 on option. 
Air France: 4 orders, 4 on option. 
Chinese government: 2 initial purchase agreements. 
Iran Air: negotiating to purchase 3. 
Pan Am: 8 options. 
American Airlines: 6 options. 
1WA: 6 options. 
United Airlines: 6 options. 
Eastern Airlines: 6 options. 
Continental Airlines: 3 options. 
Braniff Airlines: 3 options 
Qantas: 4 options 
Japan Air Lines: 3 options 
Lufthansa: 3 options 
Sabena: 2 options 
Middle East Airlines: 2 options 
Air India: 2 options 
Pan American Airways have stated that, contrary to press reports, 
they are not dropping their eight options, but the line is not expected 
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to take than all up. Air Canada has cancelled its four late-1977 options. 
Eastern Airlines have taken options on Concorde with a view to future 
Pacific ra.ttes. The United Airlines options are for the HalNaii nm. 
The airlines that have taken options on Concorde fly over 70 per cent of 
the non-communist world's scheduled passengers, a BAC spokesman says. 
The Airbus venture 
The most recent intergovernmental cooperation project is the Airbus 
A-300B, a short- and medium-haul 250-300 seat twin-jet airliner. The project 
was initially defined by an agreement signed by the French and Gennan 
governments on May 29, 1969; other agreements have since been signed with 
the Netherlanis and Spain. Deutsche Airbus, the mamfacturing enterprise, 
is owned 60 per cent by .MBB ani 40 per cent by VFW-Fokker; it estimates 
development costs at $479,210,000, with 40.5 per cent of the financing coming 
from Gennany and the same proportion from France. The Dutch partner and 
Hawker-Siddeley of Britain are each providing 6.2 per cent of the 
financing, and the remaining 6.8 per cent should come frcm the sale of the 
prototypes. There will be a small Spanish contribution to financing, and 
CASA will be responsible for 4.2 per cent of manufacture. 
The Airbus will have two General Electric CF 6-50 power plants, 
developing between twenty-:two and twenty-three tons of thrust. SNECMA. 
will be responsible for 30 per cent of the manufacture of the engines and 
MTU (Germany), 10 per cent. The engines will be assembled in France. 
The Airbus project employs over 10,500 people and by the end of 1971 
$300 million of development costs had already been spent. Taxi trials of 
the first prototype began at Toulouse this month, and the first flight is 
scheduled for later this year. Delivery of this first production model is 
planned for 1974. The first ten deliveries should be completed that year, 
with forty by the end of 1975 and seventh-three by the end of 1976. 
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Production rhythn should reach between six and ten units a month. The 
first prototype will carry 259 passengers for a range of 2,200 kilometers 
(approximately 1,300 statute miles). A second version, ordered by Air 
France (six firm orders and ten options) will carry 270-290 passengers over 
the same distance. Another 270-290 passenger version with a maximum range 
of 4,000 kilometers (approximately 2,500 miles) is to be produced for 
Iberia (two firm orders and eight options). The extended autonomy will 
be achieved by placing an additional fuel tank between the wing roots. 
The larger versions of the Airbus have an estimated price of $40,300,000 
each (1972 dollars), including spares and simulator. 
Global market for the Airbus category is put at 850 to· 1,050 
units; the European Airbus hopes to sell 400 units in the initial years 
and eventually about 600 units, including 70-80 units to the ATLAS group. 
The European Investment Bank and the President of 1 'A~rospatiale 
signed an agreement in Luxembourg on December 21, 1971 for a twelve-year 
loan of 14.4 million Units of Account (pre-devaluation dollars). The 
following day, the German government agreed to a finance guarantee for the 
assembly-line production of eight units and the development work on the 
larger derivative models. The German guarantee amounts to $620,000 per 
unit. 
The report notes that Aeritalia and Boeing are considering a coopera-
tion project on a short take-off, 100-150 seat airliner for which delivery 
would start in 1975. 
Power plant programs 
In addition to two single-country power plant programs in Europe --
the British RB 211 and the SNECMA CFM-56 [carried out in cooperation with 
General Electric] -- there are two European cooperation projects: the 
Olympus 593, for Concorde, and the M-45 H, for the VFW-614. Both are 
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Rolls-Royce/SNECMA projects. Rolls-Royce is responsible for two-thirds 
of the study and developnent of the OltmtpUs, ani SN.EO.fA. is building the 
rear part of the reactor. R and D costs were estimated at the end of 
September 1970 at $440 million fOr Rolls-Royce and $240 million for 
SNECMA. 
Twenty-eight units have already been used in flight and sixteen more 
test units are being built. Another seventeen test engines are being used 
for special tests at sea level, at high altitude, and also using the 
British Vulcan bomber as a test bed. 
Forty production model engines are being built, twenty for the certi-
fication of the two pre-production aircraft and the first three production 
units. Fran the forty-first production Concorde onward, the Olympus Mk. 
621, with 39,940 pounds of thrust will be available: this will permit non-
stop flight from New York to Frankfurt with economic payloads. 
Certification is expected in 1973 after 32,000 hours of testing in 
flight and on the work bench. Rolls-Royce and SNECMA have set up a joint 
subsidiary, Concorde Engine Support Organization, Ltd., to negotiate and 
manage supply contracts, including replacement engines and spare parts. 
The other project, the M-45 H, is a derivative of a military engine 
and has three and a half tons of thrust. It is especially suited to short-. 
haul transport craft, and will be used in the VFW-614. Its low noise level 
satisfies FAA and ICAO specifications. 
Rolls-Royce is responsible for the technical developnent, and SNEOO 
for producing the low-pressure unit. Development costs, estimated at $50 
million in 1967, have now run past $82 million. Developnent and marrufacture 
is being handled 55 per cent by Rolls-Royce and 45 per cent by SNECMA; the 
financing is 25 per cent Rolls-Royce, 25 per cent SNECMA and 50 per cent 
German government. 
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Twenty-one units are being produced, six for work bench trials and 
fifteen for flight testing. 
Government aid 
An annex report dealing with government aid policy notes that in Bri-
tain manufacturers themselves submit projects that require a government 
share in risk-capitalization: the Government then investigates the technical 
features involved, the conunercial prospects ani the total costs --
nonnally providing about half the total launching costs, including design, 
developnent, prototypes, tooling, and personnel training. But the British 
government does not usually support cost overruns. The tenns of repayment 
from sales are negotiated in advance, stitulating reimbursement from a 
certain production number onward: this means that if the number of aircraft 
sold is less than expected, the government only recovers part of its 
investment, but if a larger number is sold, the government makes a profit. 
Policy is that goverment support is a risk investment, not a subsidy. 
German governmental financial support can go as high as 60 per cent of 
development costs. German government loans are also repaid proportionally 
to sales. Same French governmental finance occasionally covers 100 per 
cent of production costs of new aeronautical materials. 
In the Netherlands, the Dutch Institute for Aeronautical Development 
administers a revolving fund which may also on occasion provide 100 per 
cent of developnent costs. Repayment is proportional to sales. 
The report makes no reference to military transnational projects 
or to general aviation. 
